Family ties data

We use census data on all Finnish firms during the period from 1996 to 2020 to study the impact of within-family CEO transitions on firm productivity. More specifically, we investigate how successions by the previous CEO’s children and other relatives affect productivity compared to successions by nonfamily CEOs. We further explore how top management team human capital (excluding the CEO) interacts with within-family CEO transitions to affect productivity. In line with prior research, we find a negative effect of family succession on productivity. Extending prior literature, we find the productivity penalty is only significant in the first two years after the transition. We further find that management team work experience is a critical ingredient in successful within-family CEO transitions. Meanwhile, we find no effect of the CEO’s education or experience, or the management team’s education, on productivity following within-family CEO succession. Finally, we explore the mechanisms, specifically management practice changes, behind the family CEO succession penalty.

Paper

Family ties may strengthen trust and coordination within entrepreneurial teams, but their consequences for external audiences remain less understood. We examine whether sibling cofounding affects startup hiring and whether this effect is moderated by lead-founder gender. We test these questions using a preregistered two-stage LinkedIn field experiment embedded in a real hiring process, complemented by a preregistered online experiment on Prolific. The field experiment provides causal evidence that sibling cofounding reduces applicant attraction, but only conditionally: the penalty is concentrated in male-leading sibling teams, whereas female-leading sibling teams in some comparisons are even weakly preferred to comparable non-family teams. Supplementary analyses further suggest that this pattern may extend to applicant sorting: among highly educated candidates, male-led sibling teams appear less attractive, whereas female-led sibling teams appear more attractive. The online experiment replicates the same asymmetric pattern and identifies startup attractiveness as the central moderated mediator: male-leading sibling teams are penalized because they are seen as less attractive employers, with this discount accompanied by stronger boundary-related concerns and weaker assessments of professionalism and fairness. An additional analysis of Finnish register data on the population of two-founder ventures shows the same asymmetry in realized employment: sibling ventures led by a brother employ fewer people in their first five years than comparable non-family ventures, whereas those led by a sister do not. Together, these findings show that sibling cofounding does not create a uniform hiring penalty. Instead, its labor-market consequences depend critically on who leads the venture.

Paper available upon request.